and signature of nature, compared with that of wisdom and understanding, nature being a thing, which cloth only do, but not know.— And elsewhere the same writer declares the difference between the spermatic Xoyoi, or reasons, and knowledges or conceptions of the mind in this manner: Ilorgpa 8e *ol* Xoyoi ovfrot at £v •pOTf/mra} aXXa TTWC Kara ra vortytara d yap Xoyoc **v* vXi? Trocst, /tea TO *irotovv* <fv<nKa>c, ov cues opaaig, aXXa Suva^uc TpeTmK:*} TTJC vX^c? OVK aXXa opeJora ftovoi^, olov TVTTOV ical cr^T/^a €v vSari, Whether are these plastic reasons or forms in the soul knowledges? but how shall it then act according to those knowledges ? for the plastic reason or form acts or works in matter, and that which acts naturally is not intellection nor vision, but a certain power of moving matter, which doth not know, but only do, and makes as it were a stamp or figure in water.

And with this doctrine of the ancients, a modern judicious writer, and sagacious inquirer into nature, seems fully to agree, that nature is such a thing as doth not know, but only do; for after he had admired that wisdom and art, by which the bodies of animals are framed, he concludes that one or other of these two things must needs be acknowledged, that either the vegetative or plastic power of the soul, by which it fabricates and organises its own body, is more excellent and Divine than the rational: or Hanr.de

Gen. Ani-

else, *' In naturae operibus neque pru- .matEX. 49. deotiam nee intellectum inesse, sed ita sohioi videri conceptui nostro, qui secundum artes nostras et facultates, seu exemplaria a nobis-metipsis rputuata, de rebus naturae diviuis judi-